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This is an important addition to the literature on nonhuman 
animal welfare and rights with some potential implications for 
environmental ethics. As the title of his book makes clear, Var-
ner is working within the utilitarian tradition. As such, issues 
relating to animal sentience, cognition and personhood will 
take on special significance. He goes beyond the intuitive spec-
ulation often found in the philosophical literature and brings a 
large body of recent empirical research to the table.
The personal setup for the book is of some interest. Utili-
tarian arguments have always been at the forefront of public 
debate and policy about animal welfare. The major player in re-
cent applied utilitarian ethics has, of course, been Peter Singer. 
Singer, in turn, was a graduate student at Oxford under one of 
the major utilitarian theorists of the twentieth century—R. M. 
Hare. As time went on, Singer struggled with utilitarian theory 
especially as it applied to issues of personhood. Meanwhile, 
Hare struggled with a few issues in applied ethics including the 
moral status of animals, but he never got beyond a position he 
tagged as “demi-vegetarianism.” Varner seeks to weave these 
two thick threads of the utilitarian cloth a little closer together. 
The book is divided into three parts. Part I develops a solid 
reassessment of Hare’s normative theory. Philosophers may 
find the treatment of Hare’s metaethics a bit on the light side 
but, for better or worse, interest in the meaning of moral terms 
has flagged since Hare wrote The Language of Morals in 1952. 
So, I suspect, not too many of the people who will be interested 
in Varner’s book will lament this lack of metaethical weight. 
There is a discussion of Hare’s basic views about the logic of 
moral language but it trails pretty quickly into normative ter-
ritory. 
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He proceeds to a nice explanation of Hare’s displeasure with 
the standard method for assessing the adequacy of normative 
theories. This method was formalized, as much as it probably 
can be, by Rawls in his Theory of Justice. According to Rawls, 
only a process of “reflective equilibrium” can reasonably as-
sess theories. We bring our pre-theoretical intuitions to bear for 
and against various theories, like utilitarianism, and, somehow, 
see which of them best fit those intuitions. The test cases get 
trotted out, the counterintuitive results are duly logged in the 
textbooks and, at some point, the theories under analysis, like 
utilitarianism, are found too counterintuitive to warrant rational 
assent. This method is on display in almost every ethics class in 
almost every university. It is used all the time on ordinary mor-
al claims that ordinary people assert all the time. Hare hated it.
Varner notes the “scathing review” Hare wrote of A Theory 
of Justice in 1973. Instead of mere intuitions, Hare thought 
theories ought to be checked against the very logic of moral 
discourse. When this is done, Hare argued, only utilitarianism 
emerges as a reasonable choice. Whatever is right about oth-
er theories like Kant’s or relativism or any rights theory will 
be covered in a full analysis under utilitarianism. Moreover, 
none of the test cases usually thrown in the faces of utilitar-
ians will ultimately stand up. Many of the specific arguments 
Hare produced can be used even if one is defending utilitarian-
ism through the method of reflective equilibrium. This is good 
because most utilitarians continue to rely on this method to 
defend their theory. It is also good because few philosophers 
will be any better convinced by Varner’s rendition of Hare’s 
arguments than they ever were by Hare himself. It is also good 
that not much of what follows in Varner’s book really relies on 
Hare’s position that utilitarianism is the only normative view 
consistent with the logic of moral discourse.
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Less revolutionary, and more generally agreeable, is Hare’s 
“two-level utilitarianism.” Variants of the two-level approach 
are as old as utilitarianism itself. There is a level—Hare called 
it the “critical level”—at which utilitarianism requires that each 
act be chosen so as to maximize utility. However, a world in 
which everyone always attempted—act by act—to maximize 
utility would almost certainly not result in maximal utility. 
The world is not full of ideally rational and perfectly informed 
moral agents. The world is full of unexpected consequences 
that only a perfectly informed and rational “archangel” (to use 
Hare’s term) could foresee. What makes utilitarian sense in the 
real world of imperfections and surprises is the construction, 
adoption and advocacy of rules, laws, habits and customs that 
will, as an “intuitive-level system,” most likely maximize util-
ity. 
As Varner admits, the general maneuver at play here was 
used by Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick and just about every defender 
of utilitarianism since. It is the base for most of the standard 
moves utilitarians make to get around the standard objections 
to the theory. Suppose you could save three people with fail-
ing organs by killing an innocent person and harvesting his 
organs to save the first three. Wouldn’t utilitarianism require 
that? So goes the standard test case. And here goes the standard 
response: Only if you are prepared to ignore all of the disutility 
generated by a standardization of this practice along with the 
routine training of medical professionals to think the practice 
is morally required. Without the assumption of such ignorance 
the practice could never be even imagined as felicitous. So it 
would go with a long list of other counterexamples. Is it OK to 
frame an innocent person if doing so would stop a crime wave? 
Is it OK to drown your Aunt Bea in a bathtub in order to secure 
her inheritance and then do good with it? Is it OK to publicly 
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torture prisoners for the amusement of the sadistic masses? In 
each case the utilitarian is likely to respond by pointing out that 
justifying any of these things would entail setting up a world 
full of motives, incentives, habits and virtues that would be—
from a utilitarian point of view—perverse.
Early on, Varner brings the two-level move to an old division 
among those concerned with the treatment of animals. Since 
the publication of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights in 
1983, there has existed a split between animal welfarists (typi-
fied by Singer’s position in his 1975 book Animal Liberation) 
and animal rightists like Regan. At the theoretical level this 
is supposed to be grounded in an irreconcilable split between 
utilitarians and those, like Regan, who reject utilitarianism in 
favor of a belief that there are fundamental rights that trump all 
utilitarian calculations. (Regan is responsible for the Aunt Bea 
example mentioned in the previous paragraph.) Indeed utilitar-
ians have not always been sagacious in their talk about rights. 
Bentham famously claimed that talk of rights was nonsense and 
talk of natural rights was “nonsense on stilts.” But then, utilitar-
ians since Mill have gotten used to apologizing for Bentham’s 
occasional misfirings. And, since Mill, utilitarians have usually 
thought it important to develop a theory of rights. For most, 
rights are to be grounded in exactly the sorts of customs and 
laws that exist in the intuitive-level system. So, a utilitarian can 
say, with a reasonably straight face, that animals have certain 
rights—and that Aunt Bea has a right to not be killed by her 
calculating nephew.
I’m not sure any anti-utilitarian is going to be swayed by the 
arguments Varner presents in Part I. He doesn’t seem to expect 
any such success. But even an anti-utilitarian will recognize 
that Varner has done a decent job of presenting the view and 
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defending it as at least one way to approach issues related to the 
treatment of nonhuman animals by humans.
In Part II, Varner takes up the matter of how morally con-
siderable nonhumans can be sorted into three categories that 
must be of interest to a utilitarian: persons, near-persons and 
the merely sentient. One might wonder why a utilitarian should 
be concerned about these groupings at all, let alone why any 
utilitarian must be concerned about them. There is some history 
here. Another of Bentham’s famous claims is this: quantity of 
pleasure being equal, “pushpin is as good as poetry.” In other 
words, pleasure is pleasure. It doesn’t matter that philosophers 
have almost universally held that some kinds of pleasures are 
higher and better than others. In the end, for a utilitarian, the 
pleasure of a fool is just as good as the pleasure of a bookworm 
which is, in turn, no better than the pleasure of a pig. The value 
of a life is to be cashed out entirely in terms of how much plea-
sure it yields, not what kind of pleasure it produces.
Mill tried to answer Bentham: “It is better to be a human be-
ing dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissat-
isfied than a fool satisfied.” The response is troublesome. How 
can Mill, or any utilitarian, hold a straightforward hedonistic 
theory of value on the one hand and then deny it by saying that 
some pleasures are qualitatively superior to others? Updating 
the utilitarian theory of value to preference utilitarianism won’t 
help. Aren’t certain higher, distinctively human, preferences 
more valuable than the lower ones we share with nonhumans? 
As troubling as Mill’s answer is, most utilitarians have thought 
there is something very right about it. Even animal welfarists 
like Singer have to admit that, almost always, it would be better 
to kill a pig rather than a human. One can attempt a Bentham-
ite’s exit by arguing that our intuition in favor of the human 
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is justified on utilitarian grounds because the life of a typical 
human will produce more pleasure that that of a typical pig. 
But what if the human in question is, as Mill hypothesized, not 
all that satisfied or satisfying, and the pig is as happy as a pig 
eating shit?
Maybe there is no coherent way out of this for the utilitar-
ian other than to bite the Benthamite bullet and hold that the 
only thing that makes the typical human more valuable than 
the typical farm animal is that the human’s life is likely to pro-
duce more utility. But Varner tries to do something else. What 
he tries has, at least, the virtue of tying him to a lot of work 
done by others working in the field (notably, Singer, Jeff Mc-
Mahon, Michael Tooley, Dale Jamieson and Regan). First, he 
wants to hold that there is, indeed, some real value attribut-
able to personhood that is not easily and simply reducible to 
hedonic calculation. Its value emerges only within the context 
of the intuitive-level system. Second, he finds this value in the 
same general vicinity it is found by those noted parenthetically 
above: personhood emerges as a consequence of autonoetic (or 
self-perceiving) consciousness. This gets him close to, for ex-
ample, Regan’s idea that a being has inherent value if it is the 
“experiencing subject of a life.” Specifically, Varner defines a 
person as “an individual who deserves special treatment or re-
spect because he, she or it has a biographical sense of self.”
He puts some flesh on this idea by drawing on Marya 
Schechtman’s The Constitution of Selves. Under this view full 
personhood can only emerge in individuals who can locate 
themselves within a story of their lives. The special, and moral, 
significance of the sort of stories persons use to locate them-
selves in the world of other beings and other selves explains 
why there is something special about Socrates that is lacking in 
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the pig. Socrates lives in a story. The pig can only have a story 
if a person like Socrates tells it. Even then, the story of the pig 
is not something the pig is really aware of. It cannot enrich the 
existence of the pig with a complex narrative that ties together 
the past, the present and the future. It cannot bring meaning to 
the whole of the pig’s life and to the daily burdens of the beast. 
As such, we cannot have respect for the life of the pig in the 
same way we can for the person. The person’s life has a trajec-
tory that rises from awareness of the past and projects itself as 
plans for the future. Interference with these plans damages the 
person and wanton disregard for these plans shows disrespect 
of the person.
Varner doesn’t mention this but this autonoetic tack ties him 
in not just with people currently working in the realm of animal 
ethics but with the utilitarian tradition going back to Mill. Any-
one who has been confused by Mill’s claim that some pleasures 
are qualitatively better than others has probably been able to 
guess that Mill thinks the confusion is somehow settled by an 
appeal to his views about individuality. As these views emerge 
in the enigmatically romantic third chapter of On Liberty Mill 
stresses the importance of struggling to develop one’s own 
tastes, opinions and character. It is a small step to think that he 
is talking, at least in part, about the development of one’s own 
story. There are other connections Varner does mention to Ar-
istotle, Nietzsche and MacIntyre. In sum, there is nothing par-
ticularly odd about this approach to personhood. It has a pretty 
rich and respectable story of its own among philosophers. 
One consequence that Varner draws from the autonoetic ap-
proach is that linguistic understanding appears to be essentially 
related to personhood. After all, there can be no story with-
out the words needed to tell it. As he puts it, “competence in a 
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natural language is a necessary (but obviously not sufficient) 
condition on personhood.” A whiff of Descartes is perhaps in 
the air as Varner concludes that no nonhuman can be a person 
because none of them appear to be able to master in any com-
pelling way enough of a natural language to communicate or 
understand a story. But, of course, Varner is not going to argue, 
as Descartes did, that nonhumans are, therefore, non-conscious 
and, therefore, just machines. Also, he is not going to rest his 
case on a simple assertion that no nonhumans are capable of 
mastering a natural language. Varner makes this claim on the 
basis of research.
This same body of research indicates that nonhumans ap-
proach personhood to varying degrees. Some are close enough 
to be called near-persons. Others fall into the set of the merely 
sentient. Varner does a good job of presenting the empirical 
research now available to a community of thinkers (i.e., ethi-
cists) who may know little of it. His descriptions of the relevant 
studies are clear, as are his arguments about why this research 
really matters for the issues at hand. Early in Part II Varner 
presents some of the research that bears on the issue of mere 
sentience. The results are nicely summarized in three tables and 
pretty closely match the intuitions of philosophers who have 
been writing in the area. Vertebrates pretty clearly seem to be 
sentient under any objective and empirical standard. The only 
slight surprise is that there appears to be less question about 
the sentience of fish, snakes and birds than some might have 
imagined. Insects and earthworms don’t do so well. Octopi and 
squid occupy a grey area. 
When it comes to determining near-personhood, things are 
a little less intuitive. The idea that anything like autonoetic 
consciousness can be empirically measured across species is 
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bound to strike some philosophers as prima facie nutty. But 
there is research that purports to do just that and it is at least 
worth a look from anyone serious about the matter. Varner is 
aware of the philosophical bog he is wading into and spends 
a lot of time giving good arguments that the studies he reports 
really are measuring what they say they are, viz., the likelihood 
of self-consciousness. He describes three kinds of experimen-
tal examinations on the issue: tests of episodic memory, tests 
of self-recognition and tests for the presence of a “theory of 
mind.” The third is less spooky than it sounds. The presence of 
a “theory of mind” is indicated when a scheming, planning and 
manipulative individual shows  awareness that other individu-
als seem to be scheming, planning and manipulating things as 
well. In the end, the group of near-persons seems to contain 
some of the usual suspects: primates, dolphins and maybe el-
ephants. But there is also a surprise: corvids (i.e., ravens, jays 
and the like) and maybe parrots. 
Part III ties the first two Parts of the book together by for-
mulating intuitive-level system rules in light of the analyses of 
personhood, near-personhood and mere sentience. He begins 
by arguing that there are good reasons for any society to have 
an intuitive-level rule against the unnecessary killing of sen-
tient individuals. Such a rule, of course, throws a lot of weight 
on the word “necessary” and, ultimately, such a rule will not 
give us much of a practical tool. It will, however, remind us that 
all sentient beings ought to count from a moral point of view.
The question of whether or not we are justified in killing 
animals for food brings Varner to an issue that Singer struggled 
with for about twenty years and never successfully resolved. 
On the face of it, utilitarianism would seem to justify the killing 
of animals for food. As long as cattle, for example, are treated 
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humanely, painlessly slaughtered and then replaced with more 
cattle who will be treated similarly what is morally wrong with 
the practice from a utilitarian point of view? Aren’t all animals 
“replaceable” in this sense? In fact, aren’t all persons similarly 
replaceable? Varner does a nice job of pulling apart the philo-
sophical maneuvers Singer attempted between the writing of 
Animal Liberation in 1975 and that of Practical Ethics in 1993. 
In the end he argues that Singer needs to concede to the objec-
tions piled up by Parfit, Hart and Hare. A consistent utilitarian 
must treat all individuals, persons or not, as ultimately replace-
able. In the end, at the critical level, long-term total utility must 
decide all issues. If this entails weighing the utility associated 
with actual beings against that of merely potential (and thus, 
currently non-existent) “beings” then so be it. Two corvids in 
the bush in the future may, indeed, be better than one in the 
hand at the present.
An annoying consequence of this concession arises imme-
diately. If the interests of future beings must be weighed in 
against those of current beings then do current beings have an 
obligation to sacrifice their own best interests in order to bring 
those future beings into existence and, thusly (we suppose), 
increase the sum total of utility over the long term? Here the 
Harefied Singer faces Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” Do we 
have an obligation to drive human population up to, say, 40 bil-
lion even though the average per capita utility would be cut in 
half relative to the world we live in now with its population of 
around 7 billion? The obvious (and, for a lot of people, obvi-
ously wrong) answer is “yes.” 
There are lots of ways to avoid the repugnant conclusion but 
Varner uses this as an opportunity to display the merits of two-
level utilitarian analysis. While the 40-billion-person world 
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may be required at the critical level, there are lots of good 
reasons, at the intuitive level, to leave reproductive decisions 
to the individuals who would have to do the reproducing and 
tend (either as parents or taxpayers) to the offspring that result. 
This solution is not trouble-free. Neither are the rejoinders that 
might expose the trouble. Nor are the counter-rejoinders that 
would follow.
Similar reasoning is on display in the concluding sections of 
the book when Varner moves to the issue of sustainable agri-
culture. From the two-level point of view, questions about how 
many people ought to be raising how many animals is a matter 
of how we can best engineer our intuitive-level laws, regula-
tions and expectations in a way so as to approach the critical-
level ideal. Dashing immediately to the conundrums presented 
by the ideal is fun but not entirely useful. The real work of eth-
ics in the real world is a matter of sweating through the details 
in an orderly and, ultimately, utilitarian way.
At the beginning and at the end of the book, Varner realizes 
that philosophers who hate utilitarianism are not going to be 
happy with this approach or the sequel promised by Varner. 
Nor are philosophers inclined to larger views like Taylor’s bio-
centrism or the ecocentrism of Leopold and Callicott. They are 
all likely to wonder why people like Varner are so obsessed 
with the details of small things like pain or personhood. Ver-
tebrates, after all, make up only about three percent of the ani-
mals on Earth. Throw in the plants, fungi, bacteria and the rest 
and the percent of living things that meet the minimal qualifi-
cations for sentience or personhood shrinks even more. Why 
are a few components in the package of survival mechanisms 
that are vital to so few creatures of such overwhelmingly moral 
significance in the broadest scheme of life on this planet? The 
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promise of a sequel centered on the blatantly anthropocentric 
concept of “sustainability” is not encouraging.
That outburst out of the way, I think there is something ter-
ribly right about the Harean point of view that Varner so ef-
fectively applies in this book. I’m not sure that it is logic that 
forces serious thought in a utilitarian direction but something 
does. Early on (p. 86) Varner mentions the work of the psychol-
ogist Jonathan Haidt and Haidt’s argument that some deeply 
embedded intuitions drive us this way. This isn’t very Harean 
but it may be very right. 
Whatever compels us toward utilitarianism, the theory is 
extraordinarily durable. Counterexamples are easily dreamt 
up but hard to sustain. Even when the theory seems to say the 
wrong thing it locates a serious problem in need of further anal-
ysis. Varner does a great job of bringing this advantage to the 
fore and promises more of the same regarding the mushy no-
tion of sustainability. If the book currently under review is any 
indication, maybe he can pull it off. If not he has, at least, left us 
with this excellent and original contribution to the debate about 
animal welfare—or, at least, vertebrate welfare.
